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Social-Optimal Pricing in a Spatial Market: A General Analysis
Economic benefits comparisons of alternative spatial pricing policies have
received much attention in the literature. There are three oft-studied spatial price
policies, including (1) uniform mill pricing (hereafter, UMP) under which the seller
chooses a constant f.o.b. price and transportation costs are paid by consumers; (2)
spatial price discrimination (SPD) under which different and location-specific prices
are selected over space; and (3) uniform delivered pricing (UDP) under which
consumers at different market sites pay the same delivered price. The oft-used
measures of economic benefits are total output sold, profit, consumers’surplus, social
welfare, and so on. The market the firm faces maybe a spatial monopoly, or
Beckmann’s spatial monopolistic competition, namely that each firm is the sole seller
in its own market since it charges its buyers a lower delivered price than neighbor
firms can offer (Beckamnn, 1970). Moreover, while firm faces competition, three
oft-studied types of spatial competition are the Loschian one under which the market
radius is assumed fixed and within the boundary the firm acts like a monopolist
(Losch, 1954), and the Hotelling-Smithies competition under which firms assume the
price charged by neighboring firm is fixed (Hotelling, 1929, and Smithies, 1941),
while the price at the boundary is fixed in the Greenhut and Ohta’s market (Greenhut
and Ohta, 1975). One of main findings is that some conclusions previously obtained
in traditional economic models cannot remain valid when distance is costly (see, for
example, Greenhut and Ohta, 1972; Holahan, 1978; Capozza and Van Order, 1978;
Norman, 1981; Gronberg and Meyer, 1981; Hwang and Mai, 1990). Another is that
in a spatial market, price discrimination maybe socially desirable, of which
implication is it cannot be treated as illegal per se.
Almost all efforts in the literature have been devoted to the comparison of
resultant economic benefits under alternative spatial pricing policies charged by a
profit-maximizing firm, that is, the comparison is made only among those
profit-maximization prices. Only few attempts are made to derive the social optimal
pricing under alternative spatial pricing policies, and then compare the resultant
economic benefits of such pricing with those from its profit-maximizing counterpart.
In an interested paper, Holahan (1978) has made such attempt. The analysis is
conducted with a set assumptions, including (H1) individual demand is linear, (H2)
consumers are uniformly distributed over the market, (H3) the marginal cost of
production is constant, and the total fixed cost is positive, that is, the case of short-run,
(H4) the social welfare is measured by profits plus consumers surplus on a single
market point rather than on the entire market, (H5) both price and market area—the
space the firm actually serves-- are chosen in order to maximize social welfare, and
(H6) the spatial pricing policy is UMP. Norman (1981) later come to revisit the
issue with the model same as Holahan (1978) except that UMP is replaced by SPD.
Both Holahan and Norman show that in order to maximize social welfare, the
price under UMP and SPD shall equal the marginal cost of production, a spatial
equivalent of marginal cost pricing. This result together with the assumption (H3),
in turn, yield that welfare maximization requires subsidy to cover fixed production
cost. Moreover, both papers show that either under SPD or UMP, the market
area—the space the firm actually serves--is smaller under welfare-maximizing pricing
than it would be in a monopoly. In other words, more firms are needed to fill the
space in order to maximize social welfare than they would be in the case of spatial
monopoly. The cautious reader may cast some doubt about this result. In the
situation stipulated by Holahan and Norman, marginal cost pricing require subsidy to
cover those fixed costs, and thus, more firms mean more subsidy is needed. Actually,
Norman (1981) recognizes this problem, and states: “We should then ask, perhaps,
whether welfare should be maximized subject to a non-negative profit constraint,
since production subsidy will eventually imply additional consumers taxes and may
also imply output reduction in other sectors”(p. 110)
The purpose of this paper is to revisit the spatial equivalent of marginal cost
pricing. Our attempt will be made without assumption from (H1) to (H3), that is,
demand can be linear or nonlinear, the consumer density can be of any form, the fixed
costs maybe positive or zero. We will replace (H4) by the aggregate social welfare
over space since the aggregation is the natural way to measure the social welfare as a
whole. In addition to SPD and UMP, we will explore the welfare maximizing
pricing under UDP. Our model is same as Hsu (1983) with only one exception that
the market area is a control variable to maximize social welfare.
The outline of this paper is: In Section 1, we present a basic model. Three
sets of optimal prices and market area under alternative spatial pricing policies are
derived in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the comparison of the optimal market
area when the market size varies while Section 4, to the social superiority of three
spatial pricing policies.
1. Basic Model
Consider a linear market over which consumers are continuously dispersed, and
in which a single firm produces and sells a delivered product, subject to a constant
freight rate, t . In order to highlight the pure effect of economic space, we assume
in accordance with Hoover (1937) and Smithies (1941) that all individual demand are
identical of the following form
(1) )()( pfxq  , 0'f
where x denotes distance from the seller's mill, )(xq = the quantity demanded at
the market site x , p = the delivered price, the amount a consumer shall pay for a
unit of commodity, and 'f = the slope of )( pf . Equation (1) includes liner
demand postulated by Holahan (1978) and Norman (1981) as a special case.
The total output actually sold, namely, the spatial demand, can be generally
defined as
(2) dxxpfQ
B
)()(
0

where B denotes the extent of the market area over which the seller actually serves,
and )(x , the density of consumers ate the market site x . The profit is used to
measure the firm’s benefit, which can be generally expressed as:
(3) )()()]([0 QCdxxxmq
B  
where, m denotes the mill price, that is, the amount the seller can receive by selling
one unit of product, and )(QC denotes total costs of production, a function of total
output Q . Total production cost function here is of a very general form. Its
marginal cost can be constant or not. Also, it contains fixed production costs when
one focused the short run as done by Holahan (1978) and Norman (1981).
To measure a single consumer’s benefit, we adopt a simple concept of
consumer’s surplus, as defined by the excess amount of money a consumer would be
willing to pay for the commodity, over the amount he or she actually pays for. That
is,  max )()( pp dvvfxcs , where maxp = the reservation price, the maximum price a
consumer is willing to pay for a unit of commodity. Accordingly, the aggregate
benefits of all consumers (hereafter the consumer surplus) is:
(4) dxxxcsCS
B
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0
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Therefore, the level of social welfare, W , is:
(5) CSW  .
Finally, there are three possible spatial pricing policies to be adopted in a spatial
market. Moreover, we assume in accordance with Holahan (1978) and Gorman (1981),
that in addition to price, the extent of the market area is endogenously determined.
In other words, three sets of social optimal prices and market area under alternative
pricing policies will be derived and examined respectively in the subsequent
discussion.
2. Optimal prices and market areas under alternative pricing policies
Consider first spatial price discrimination under which different mill prices
can be charged at different sites. Since under mill pricing, consumers have to pay
for freight costs incurred, (4) can be written as
(6) )()()( ddd mCSmmW 
where dm denotes a set of discriminatory mill prices. The term )( dmW is a
functional since dm is a function of distance x , and thus, we employ the technique
of calculus of variations to derive the optimal shape of dm , denoted by
w
dm .
We shall first examine the property of the social optimal market area. The first
order condition for welfare-maximization with respected to the market area is that
given the mill price schedule is optimal, it is
(7) )()()]([/)( wd
w
d
w
d
w
ddd BBqQmcmBmW  )()( wdwd BBcs  = 0
where dQdCmc / denotes the marginal costs of production, a function of total
production, )( wd
w
d mQQ  is the total output actually sold with optimal mill prices
w
dm , and
w
dB denotes the extent of the welfare-maximizing market area under SPD.
Now let dm =
w
dm )(xzh , where )(xh is an arbitrary function of distance x , and
z , an arbitrary scalar. Substituting dm =
w
dm )(xzh in (5) yields
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which is a function of the scalar z . Accordingly, we have
(9) zmCSzmzmW ddd  /)(/)(/)( 
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where the third equality is based on rearranging and on the fact that
zxcs  /)(  max /])([ pp dzdvvfd 
max )(])([
p
p
xhdvvf , and the last equality is based
on (7). Since )(xh is arbitrary, and 0'f , it follows from (9) that the necessary
condition for welfare maximization requires, in turn, for any market site:
(10) )( wd
w
d Qmcm  .
Thus, substituting (10) in (7) yields that the social optimal market area under SPD
must satisfy the following condition
(11) 0)( wdBcs
Equation (10) states that from society’s viewpoint, the set of discriminatory mill
prices should be equal to constant marginal costs of production. In other words,
although varying prices can be charged under SPD, welfare-maximizing mill prices
should be nondiscriminatory over the entire market space. Moreover, (11) indicates
that for society as a whole, the firm shall serve the market space as far as possible
until there is no individual consumer surplus at the boundary of the market area.
Consider next the uniform delivered pricing. Let up denote the uniform
delivered price. The social welfare now becomes
(12) )()()( uuu pCSppW 
The firm’s profit is:
(13) )()()]()[()( 0 QCdxxxqtxpp u
B
u
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and the consumer surplus is:
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where uB denotes the extent of the market area under UDP, and dxxN u
B
u )(0  ,
the total population served by the firm under UDP. The first order condition of
welfare maximization with respect to the market area is:
(15) uu BpW  /)( = )()}(])()[({ uuuwuuu BBcstBQmcppf  = 0
where )( wu
w
u pQQ  . To derive the welfare maximization price under UDP, one may
differentiate (12) to obtain
(16)  uu ppW /)( dxxtxppf uBu u )()()(' 0  dxxpf uBu )()( 0 
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in which the second equality is based on (15). Noting that )()('max pfdvvf
p
pu
 , (16)
becomes:
(17) uu ppW  /)( dxxtxQmcppf wuuBu u )(])([)(' 0 
Thus, the welfare-maximizing price under UDP, wup , is
(18) xtQmcp wu
w
u  )(
where u
B Ndxxxx u /)(0  . The term x is the simple spatial mean of consumer
distribution, or the average distance since dxxN uBu )(0  , the total population
served by the firm under UDP, and uNx /)( is the probability density of consumer
locating over space. Equation (18) indicates that although the seller is initially
supposed to absorb all freight costs incurred, the welfare-maximizing price under
UDP should contain “transferred”transportation costs in addition to marginal cots of
production. Moreover, by substituting (18) in (15) and upon rearranging, the extent
of the welfare-maximizing market area, wuB , is
1:
(19) wuB tpfBcsx uu )(/)( .
Consider finally the uniform mill pricing. The level of social welfare is:
(20) )()()( fff mCSmmW 
where fm = the uniform mill price under UMP. The firm’s profit is:
(21) )()()()( 0 fff
B
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and the consumer surplus is:
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where )( ff mQQ  , and fB denotes the extent o the market area under UMP. The
first order conditions for welfare-maximization with respected to the market area is:
(23) ff BmW  /)( )()}()((.)]{[ wfwfwfff BBcstBmfmcm  =0,
where wfB denotes the extent of the welfare-maximization market area under UMP.
To derive the welfare maximization uniform mill price, one may differentiate (20) to
obtain
(24) dxxdvvfdxxfmcmfmmW
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where the second equality is based on (23), and the last equality , on dvvf
p
pu
)('
max
= )( pf . Accordingly, the welfare-maximizing mill price under UMP, wfm , is
(27) )( wf
w
f Qmcm 
where )( wf
w
f mQQ  . Equation (27) shows that in order to maximize social welfare,
1 Hsu (1983) has examined the case that the market is bounded, that is, the market area is exogenously
determined by the market size, say R . It is clear that if wuBR  , then there is no consumer locating
at the market site wuB , that is, 0)( wuB , and thus, (8) holds. In other words, the model
postulated in this paper can include Hsu (1983) as a special case.
the uniform mill price should equal marginal costs of production. Moreover, by
substituting (27) in (23), the following relation must hold at the boundary of the
market area under UMP:
(28) 0)( wfBcs
Here we observe from (10) and (27) that the welfare maximization mill prices
are same under SPD and UMP. It follows from (11) and (28) that the firm serves the
same market area under SPD as it would be under UMP. We may then refer
hereafter both SPD and UMP simply by mill pricing, and let wf
w
d
w
m mmm  , and
w
m
w
d
w
f BBB  , where wmm and wmB denotes the welfare-maximization mill price
and market area under mill pricing, respectively. Moreover, the welfare maximizing
delivered price schedule under mill pricing is txmp wm
w
m  .
Two welfare maximization delivered prices of UDP and mill pricing are equal at
the market site xx (see figure 1). Thus, fd pp  accordingly as xx , and
vise versa. That is, relative to mill pricing, the welfare-maximizing price under UDP
imposes a welfare loss on each nearby buyer in the region (0, x ), and results in a
welfare gain on the buyer in region ( x , wuB or
w
mB ).
3. Welfare-maximizing prices and market areas when the market size varies
In the real world, the length of the spatial market maybe infinite or finite. It is
worthy pointing out that when the market is small, (11) or (19) might over-estimate the
extent of the market area. What (11) actually states is that once we know specific
form of demand, costs of transportation and production, and the optimal price, the
value of wmB can then be determined, regardless of whether there are any consumers
locating at that market site. So does (19). It is clear that if there is no buyer at those
market sites, the extent of the market area should equal the length of the market size,
say S . Accordingly, the following rule should be used to determine the extent of the
market area
(29) ),min( wi
w
i SSB 
where wiS stands for the distance satisfying (11) and (19) respectively under
alternative pricing policies.
Equation (29) implies that only when the market size is small such that wuSS  ,
and wmSS  , the extent of the welfare-maximization market area is exogenously fixed
by the market size. That is, SBwm  , and SBwu  . One may refer this case to the
small market. Note also that this small market is the case examined by Hsu (1983).
Nevertheless, the analysis of Section 2 applies to the small market, as shown below.
In a small market, the market area remains unchanged with a change in price,
that is,
(30) 0///  uuffd dpdBdmdBdzdB .
Thus, one of necessary conditions for welfare maximization under alternative pricing
policies in Section 2 can be omitted, namely, (9), (15) and (23). Moreover, by
substituting (30) in the relevant first order welfare maximization condition with
respected to the price, that is, (8), (14), and (24), the welfare maximization prices
under alternative pricing policies shall have the same form as those presented in
Section 2.
We can now compare the extents of the market area under alternative pricing
policies. Since the demand function given by (1) is too general to derive any
analytical conclusion, we assume in accordance with Greenhut, Hwang, and Ohta
(1975) that the individual demand function is of the general form:2
2
Equation (31) implies that )]2/1(222 )])][(/)1[(/)("  vbpabvppff since
]/)1[())(/(/)(' vvbpabvppff  . Thus, 1v , 1v , and 1v respectively yields
that "f is greater than, equal to, or less than zero and thereby, demand curves are convex, linear, or
convex from above. Accordingly, (31) “is, in fact, completely general” for the purpose of spatial 
price theory (see Greenhut, Hwang, and Ohta, 1975, especially, fn. 10, p. 673 for their argument)
(31) )()( pfxq  )/1()( vbpa
Thus, the reservation price is bap /max  , and btbcaS wm /)(  . Moreover,
since dvvfxcs
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p
)()( max 1/1)(  vbpa ])1/([ bvv  , the market area under UDP is:
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Note also that )]1(/[)( vbtxbtbcaSS wu
w
m  > 0 since 0 xbtbca is required
for 0)( upf . Thus, the following results hold
(33) wu
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Formally,
Proposition 1: Except the market is small, the welfare-maximizing market area is
greater under mill pricing than it would be under UDP
Proposition 1 implies that except the market is small, the welfare maximizing
pricing under UDP will produce more plants than mill pricing. Moreover, it
demonstrates that those results obtained by Hsu (1983) hold only when the market is
small.
4. Social superiority among welfare-maximizing pricing policies
Social superiority among these pricing policies in terms of social welfare is:
Proposition 2: The welfare maximization milling pricing should be nondiscriminatory
over space, and equal to marginal costs of production, while the uniform delivered
pricing will never be socially superior to mill pricing.
The first part of Proposition 2 is based on the fact that the welfare maximization mill
prices under mill pricing are same, and constant over space although varying mill
prices is allows to being charged under SPD. To show the second part of Proposition
2, note first that the welfare-maximization problem under SPD is an optimization
without any constraint, but that under UDP, a constrained one. Accordingly, the
level of social welfare cannot be larger under UDP than it would be under SPD, and
so does the mill pricing in general.
The first part of Proposition 2 is a spatial equivalent of marginal cost pricing.
Moreover, Proposition 2 holds for any spatial buyer density with different shapes and
various sizes, and thus, it includes the result of Hsu (1983) obtained with the small
market assumption as a special case.
